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Place-Based Consequences
of Person-Based Transfers
Brad J. Hershbein
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Local labor markets that lose
greater shares of employment
during recessions suffer
persistent relative decreases in
earnings per capita.
n The social safety net
responds, and areas with 5
percent greater employment
losses experience per-capita
government transfers 2.5
percent higher even a
decade later.
n These transfers replace about
25 percent of lost earnings in
the long term, and much
of this is through retirement
and disability (Social Security)
or health (Medicare
and Medicaid).
n The social safety net thus
helps affected places as
well as people, but the longterm assistance does little
to help with needed skills
development or job creation.
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As the nation continues to recover from the
economic recession caused by the COVID-19
pandemic, Congress continues to debate
how to extend the social safety net, even afer
unprecedented (and temporary) responses over
the past 18 months. An important part of the
debate is whether government assistance should
expand beyond what is traditionally thought of as
social insurance—transfers like the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, also known
as food stamps), Temporary Assistance to Needy
families (TANF), and unemployment insurance
(UI)—to also cover programs that increase skills
development, such as employment training and
tuition-free community college. Tis matters
because previous research has shown that areas
that were particularly hard hit during a recession
can sufer long-lasting declines in employment
rates and per-capita earnings relative to areas that
escaped the recession unscathed (Hershbein and
Stuart 2020). With parts of the country heavily
reliant on tourism still lagging behind in their
economic recovery, it is an open question how
well the social safety net—or government transfers
more generally—respond to recessions not just
in the short term but over longer horizons as
well. If transfers remain elevated persistently,
then places that experience only mild recessions
implicitly subsidize through the tax code places
that experience bad recessions, even as economic
opportunity remains depressed in these latter
places.
In forthcoming work, my coauthor Bryan
A. Stuart and I examine the response of the
social safety net to place-specifc shifs in
economic activity arising from recessions over
the past 50 years. Drawing on annual data we
have harmonized for 363 metropolitan areas,
we estimate how average receipt of diferent
government transfer programs, on a per-capita
basis, evolve for up to a decade afer each of the

fve recessions between the 1970s and the Great
Recession. (We cannot yet investigate the COVID
recession.)
We fnd that person-based transfer programs
generate a substantial amount of place-based redistribution. Metropolitan areas that experience
more severe employment losses during a recession
face lasting reductions in employment and

A typically-sized metro of
260,000 people that sufers a worse
recession will receive over half a
billion dollars more in transfers over
the next decade.
earnings per capita, but they also receive lasting
increases in transfers per capita. Our estimates
imply that a metro area experiencing a 5 percent
greater employment loss during the recession has
total transfers per capita 2.5 percent higher nearly
a decade afer the recession ended. For a metro
area of typical size, about 260,000 residents, this
translates into more than half a billion dollars of
transfers over this time period. Moreover, most of
these transfers are not from what we think of as
either employment-related social insurance or the
traditional safety net of means-tested programs.
Although the former (UI) does respond in the
short term, the increase fades away relatively
quickly; the latter safety net programs show a
more sustained rise, but they are relatively small,
accounting for only a tenth of total transfers.
Instead, large entitlement programs including
Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid continue
to grow afer a recession and account for nearly all
of the long-term increase. Education and training
programs, which might help boost skills and future
earnings, barely respond at all.
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Government Transfers in the
United States
Te United States transfers
considerable sums of money to
individuals through various programs.
As of 2017, and across 363 metro areas
accounting for more than 80 percent

Total transfers replace about one-ffth
of lost earnings soon after the
Great Recession ended in 2009, but
this share rises over time.
of the total population, per-person
transfers averaged nearly $8,300
annually. Tis represents a quadrupling
since 1970, even afer adjusting for
infation, and over 15 percent of
average income. As shown in Figure
1, much of these transfers consist of
retirement and disability insurance—
Social Security, essentially—and
medical programs including Medicare
and Medicaid. Te latter category has

grown especially quickly, becoming
the largest category around 2000 and
today consisting of almost half of total
transfers. By comparison, income
maintenance or means-tested programs
(primarily TANF and its predecessor,
the Earned Income Tax Credit, SNAP,
and Supplemental Security Income)
equal about 10 percent of total transfers
on average. Unemployment insurance
is much smaller on average, though it
tends to rise afer recessions and job
losses. Transfers for veterans (pensions
and VA coverage) and education and
training (Pell Grants and workforce
training) are quite small on the whole,
in part because their coverage is much
more limited than the other programs.
Our Analysis
To investigate how employment
losses during a recession afect percapita transfers, we compare how these
transfers evolve each year between
metro areas that experienced diferentsized employment changes, or shocks,

Figure 1 Per-Capita Transfers Have Risen Sharply over Time
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NOTE: The fgure reports national annual totals, per person, of diferent government transfers by category across
363 metropolitan areas (CBSAs), together accounting for about 80 percent of the U.S. population. Amounts are in
dollars per person, infation-adjusted to 2017.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations of U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis data.
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during the recession. We separately
analyze fve national recessions: those
in 1973–1975, 1980–1982 (we combine
1980 and 1982 in this “double-dip”
recession), 1990–1991, 2001, and
2007–2009. Our approach assumes that
the path of per-capita transfers would
have evolved similarly between areas
in the absence of difering recession
severity. To make this assumption
more plausible, we control for several
characteristics of the metro areas.
Tese include pre-recession population
growth for diferent age groups to
control for demographic diferences
and (nine) census division indicators
so that we are implicitly comparing
metro areas within the same division
of the country. In both of these cases,
we allow these controls to vary by
each year we observe transfers, thus
controlling for age dynamics (such as
the diferential aging of the population)
and gradual shifs in economic
activity, such as the rise of the sunbelt.
We further control for metro area
characteristics that don’t vary over
time, so our results capture changes
relative to a metro’s own pre-recession
path, vis-à-vis the changes in another
metro that difered in recession
intensity.

Figure 2 shows how per-capita
transfers respond in metros with a
1 percent greater employment loss
during the respective recession. Te
horizontal axis measures years since
the recession ends (more specifcally,
when national employment bottomed
out; recessions typically begin two
years earlier). Tus, the lef-most part
of the fgure shows the period before
the recession begins. Tat values are
close to zero indicates that diferences
in transfers between areas that will
experience severe recessions and those
that will experience mild recessions
are small before the recession begins,
in line with expectations. Once the
recession begins, however, transfers

EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH • OCTOBER 2021

rise sharply, and reach a value of about
0.5 by recession’s end; this means
that a 1 percent greater loss in metro
employment during the recession
implies a 0.5 percent greater increase
in per-capita transfers. Moreover, even
afer the recession is over, each line
stays elevated above zero and some
even continue to grow. Terefore, even
a decade later transfers are higher in
metro areas that experienced a more
severe recession: across recessions, a
5 percent greater recession-induced
employment loss on average implies 2.5
percent greater transfers per person.
How much of the persistent loss in
per-capita earnings do these transfers
replace, and which types of transfers
account for this sustained rise? We
address these questions for the Great
Recession in Figure 3. Total transfers
replace about one-ffh of lost earnings
soon afer the Great Recession ended
in 2009, but this share rises over time
(partly because earnings also somewhat
recover over time while transfers stay
about the same). By 2017, eight years
afer the recession’s end, transfers
replace about 60 percent of earnings
losses that year. (Te pattern varies
somewhat for previous recessions, but
the replacement share tends to rise over
time.) Figure 3 also shows that while UI
shows a slight bump near the end of the
recession, the efect fades, and medical
and retirement and disability programs
(Medicare, Medicaid, and Social
Security) account for the vast majority
of the long-term rise. Other programs,
including traditional safety net ones,
contribute less, especially over time.
Discussion and Implications
Tese results paint a nuanced
picture of the response of the safety
net. Programs that receive the
greatest attention in discussions
of countercyclical policy—such as
unemployment insurance, TANF, and
SNAP—play little role in ofsetting
the long-run relative earnings losses
in metro areas that experience more
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Figure 2 Transfers Remain Elevated after the Recession Ends
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NOTE: The fgure reports estimates of the impact of a 1 percent greater employment loss on the percent
change in per-capita transfers for the years surrounding a recession, for each of fve recession. The vertical
black line at 0 indicates the end of the recession—when employment has bottomed out; thus, positive
numbers on the horizontal axis indicate years since the recession ended while negative numbers count
backwards (most recessions begin at t−2). A value of 0.5 on the vertical axis means that a 1 percent greater
employment loss results in a 0.5 percent greater increase in per-capita transfers.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations of U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and other data.

Figure 3 Transfers Replace Only Part of Lost Earnings
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NOTE: The fgure reports how the increased transfers from Figure 2 compare to losses in per-capita earnings
by year and transfer type. For example, in 2010 the increase in total transfers from a 1 percent greater
recession-induced employment loss replaced about 20 percent of per-capita earnings losses that year from
the same recession-induced employment loss.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations of U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and other data.
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severe recessions. On the other hand,
programs such as Social Security
retirement, Disability Insurance,
Medicare, and Medicaid partially
insure areas against the longer-term
efects of recessions. On average,
transfers ofset 25 percent of the
decline in earnings in metro areas hit
harder by recessions. Furthermore,
federal transfers that are nominally
person-based provide implicit,
persistent, and underappreciated
geographic transfers from
economically more successful places
to economically less successful places.
Because the long-run
consequences of recessions on local
labor markets are not yet widely
appreciated, there has been little
discussion of whether the existing
structure of the social safety net
constitutes an appropriate policy
response, not just for individuals
but for communities as a whole.
An important direction for future
research is to study how nominally
person-based transfers interact
with place-based policies, such as
economic development block grants
and place-based scholarships, in
afecting efciency and equity of
the overall system of government
transfers. One important takeaway
from our results is that the most
responsive transfer programs in
the current system are unlikely
to encourage labor supply, skill
development, or job creation, which
could be essential factors in helping
hard-hit metro areas from falling
behind economically.
Reference
Hershbein, Brad J., and Bryan A.
Stuart. 2020. “Te Enduring Local Harm
from Recessions.” Upjohn Institute Policy
Brief. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn
Institute. https://research.upjohn.org/
up_policybriefs/25/.

Brad J. Hershbein is a senior economist and
communications advisor at the Upjohn Institute.
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Economic Costs and
Benefts of Tuition-Free
College in Illinois
Timothy J. Bartik, Michelle Miller-Adams, Brian Pittelko, and Bridget Timmeney
Why should states invest in free
college for their residents? With returns
to college degrees high and most new
jobs requiring a postsecondary degree
or credential, individual motivations
for college-going are easy to discern.
As more states create free-college
pathways for their residents—and as
more will be asked to do so if the Biden
administration’s tuition-free college
plan becomes law—policymakers
should recognize that free college also
generates substantial economic and
fscal returns for the state.
Tis article presents research
fndings on the economic and fscal
impacts from a hypothetical tuitionfree college program in Illinois. Te
research was carried out with fnancial
support from the Joyce Foundation
and the cooperation of the Governor’s
Ofce of the State of Illinois. More
information on how these fndings
were generated can be found in our
cost estimate and economic benefts
reports to the state.
Economic returns to free college
come in the form of higher earnings
for workers with degrees and spillover
benefts for other residents. Fiscal
returns occur when projected tax

revenues exceed the cost of a freecollege program. Of course, there are
many other benefts to increasing
educational attainment. Employers
have access to a better-trained
workforce, which spurs innovation
and productivity. Higher educational
attainment can also reduce crime and
substance abuse, help create more
stable families, and lead to better
outcomes for the children of college
graduates. Tese impacts, however, are
hard to quantify, so we focus here on
the direct earnings efects for graduates
and spillover efects for other residents.
For this project, we modeled two
versions of tuition-free college: one
model covers the community college
sector only and the other includes
both two-year and four-year public
institutions. Both adopt a last-dollar
structure in which a student’s Pell
Grants are used frst, with the state
grant closing any remaining gap in
tuition and fees.1
A free-tuition program in Illinois
would generate economic and fscal
benefts that far exceed its costs,
although the fscal benefts would
not be realized immediately. Te less

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Free college generates substantial economic and fiscal returns for the state.
n The combined two-year and four-year program, run for just the years 2021–2030,
would increase Illinois residents’ total earnings by $44.7 billion.
n We find that a two-year degree yields earnings gains per individual of between
$154,000 and $182,000 over their lifetime, while a four-year degree yields an earnings
gain of between $671,000 and $793,000.
n We estimate spillover effects on other Illinois residents at 86 percent of the direct
effect.
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expensive program covering only
two-year college yields positive returns
more quickly, but the returns are not as
high as they are for the more expansive
(and expensive) program.
Free college leads to more college
graduates. Depending on its structure,
tuition-free college will lead more
Illinois residents to complete either a
two-year program, earning an associate
degree, or a four-year program, earning
a bachelor’s degree. Some of these
additional graduates will remain in the
state. (Our analysis focused only on the
higher earnings of graduates who remain
in the state. Graduates leaving the state
are also better of because of the program,
but we are assessing the impact of such
a program on the state and thus do not
account for benefts to out-migrants.)
People with college degrees or
credentials will earn more. Higher
degree completion will signifcantly
increase graduates’ lifetime earnings.
Tis earnings increase is due to these
graduates’ higher skills. In our analysis,
we focus on the earnings efects for
Illinois residents ages 25–79 who remain
in state for their entire careers. We fnd
that a two-year degree yields earnings
gains per individual of between $154,000
and $182,000 over their lifetime, while a
four-year degree yields an earnings gain
of between $671,000 and $793,000. Based
on the research literature, we estimate
spillover efects on other Illinois residents
at 86 percent of the direct efect.
We conclude that the combined
two-year and four-year program, run
for just the years 2021–2030, would
increase Illinois residents’ total earnings
on aggregate by $44.7 billion (in 2021
dollars; see Table 1). Tis is mostly
due to more Illinois residents earning
bachelor’s degrees. Te earnings gain
from the added bachelor’s degrees is
$39.7 billion, versus $5.0 billion from the
added associate degrees. Te greater efect
from the bachelor’s degrees is due to the
much greater annual earnings efects of
such degrees. Te two-year-only tuition
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Table 1 Aggregate Illinois Present Value of Increased Earnings for Tuition Subsidy Programs
Run from 2021 to 2030
Combined two-year and four-year program

Two-year program only

Efect in combined
program due to twoyear degrees ($)

Efect in combined
program due to fouryear degrees ($)

Efect in two-year-only
program due to twoyear degrees ($)

Direct earnings efect on
Illinois graduates who stay
in Illinois, summed over all
graduates considered in
cost estimates

2,691,437,646

21,360,458,081

4,335,339,265

Spillover earnings increase
for other Illinois workers
(86% of direct efect)

2,314,636,375

18,369,993,950

3,728,391,768

Total efect

5,006,074,021

39,730,452,031

8,063,731,033

Total efect of combined
two-year and four-year
program

44,736,526,052

subsidy program also has considerable
total earnings benefts. Such a program
run from 2021 through 2030 would
increase the present value of Illinois
residents’ total earnings by $8.1 billion.
How does this compare with the costs
of operating either of these two tuition
subsidy programs from 2021 to 2030?
Based on our modeling, a last-dollar,
community college–only program would
cost $30 million in its frst year, with
annual costs rising to $58 million by the
end of the forecast period. A last-dollar
program covering both two-year and
four-year public in-state institutions
would cost $155 million in its frst year,
with annual costs rising to $615 million

in 2030. Present value costs and benefts
of the program operated over 10 years,
beginning in 2021, are presented in
Table 2.
Te present value of total earnings
benefts from operating either of these
two programs far exceeds their costs.
For the combined four-year/two-year
program, the present value of total
earnings benefts, at $44.7 billion, is
over 11 times the present value of costs
of around $4 billion. For the two-yearonly program, the present value of total
earnings benefts, at a little over $8 billion,
is more than 18 times the present value of
program costs of $438 million.

Table 2 Aggregate Illinois Present Value Costs and Benefts of Tuition-Free College Programs
Run from 2021 to 2030
Combined two-year and
four-year program ($)

Two-year program only
($)

Present value of costs in 2021 dollars

3,978,294,564

438,274,379

Present value of direct and spillover earnings
benefts for Illinois residents

44,736,526,052

8,063,731,033

Extra state and local tax revenue (earnings
benefts times 10.63%)

4,755,492,719

857,174,609

Extra state tax revenue (earnings benefts
times 5.48%)

2,451,561,628

441,892,461
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State residents without college
degrees will earn more, too. When a
larger share of a state’s residents has a
college degree, those without a degree

Earnings gains for other Illinois
residents—those who do not get the
higher educational attainment due
to the tuition subsidy program—are
much greater than program costs.
also beneft. Higher wages for educated
workers push wages up more generally.
A state with more skilled workers will be
better able to attract and grow jobs and
businesses, which will increase the wages
of all the state’s workers. Finally, a state
with more skilled workers may develop
better amenities, public services, social
services, and community well-being, all
of which may enhance child development
and enhance the long-run earnings of the
next generation.
Our modeling shows that the earnings
gains for other Illinois residents—those
who do not get the higher educational

attainment due to the tuition subsidy
program—are much greater than
program costs. For the combined twoyear/four-year program, spillover benefts
for other workers are over $20 billion,
which is far greater than program costs of
somewhat less than $4 billion. Similarly,
for the tuition subsidies limited to twoyear programs, the spillover benefts for
other workers are about $4 billion, which
far exceeds program costs of a little over
$400 million. In response to the question
“Why should Illinois residents pay tuition
subsidies that directly beneft other
Illinois residents?”, one answer is that such
subsidies will increase overall earnings of
many Illinois workers, not just those who
get the tuition support.
States will collect more money in
taxes than the cost of a free-college
program—but not right away. Freecollege programs can also be judged by
whether their fscal benefts outweigh
their costs. Fiscal benefts come from
increased tax revenue as workers’
earnings rise. We model these benefts
based on conservative assumptions that
estimate a lower bound to their value.

Figure 1 Annual Costs and Fiscal Benefts of Illinois Combined Two-Year/Four-Year Tuition
Subsidy Program
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For a combined two-year and fouryear program, run from 2021 to 2030,
the present value of total state and local
revenue collections will be slightly under
$4.8 billion, which exceeds the present
value of program costs of around $4.0
billion. For the tuition subsidy program
for only two-year degrees, running from
2021 to 2030, the present value of state
and local revenue collections will be
almost $860 million, compared to the
present value of program costs of almost
$440 million.
Te following fgures show a
simulation of annual costs and fscal
benefts for a free-college program that
continues indefnitely.
As Figure 1 shows, the program
starts out with large annual costs, rapidly
increasing to around $500 million
per year in 2021 dollars. Annual fscal
benefts are far less because our earnings
measures do not start counting earnings
efects until graduates reach age 25, and
even afer that it takes many years before
graduates reach their peak earnings
years in their forties and early ffies. As a
result, from a total state and local revenue
standpoint, annual added revenue
collected does not exceed annual tuition
subsidy program costs until the year 2044,
where the state and local revenue line
crosses the cost line. From a state revenue
only line, annual revenue exceeds costs in
the year 2055, where the state revenue line
crosses the cost line. However, in either
case, on an annual basis, this combined
program does eventually generate
sufcient revenue that annual revenue for
just the state exceeds program costs.
Annual fscal benefts and costs of
a community college–only program
from 2021 through 2099 are shown in
Figure 2. Te fscal results of this more
limited program difer from the more
comprehensive program in two ways.
First, the annual costs and benefts are
much lower, so the short-run net fscal
costs are less, as are the long-run net
fscal benefts. Second, the “crossover”
year is fve years earlier. For this cheaper
program, state and local fscal benefts
exceed costs as of 2039, whereas the
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combined two-year and four-year
program doesn’t have such benefts
exceeding costs until 2044. For state
revenue only, this cheaper program has
fscal benefts exceeding costs by 2050,
compared to 2055 for the more expensive
combined program.
Overall, in considering these two
programs’ economic and fscal benefts
versus costs, two things stand out. First,
for either tuition subsidy program, the
true cost-beneft picture does not emerge
until at least 50 years have passed and an
entire generation has gained educational
degrees and completed their working
careers. Educational investments are
long-term investments and cannot be
evaluated properly without considering
very long-run efects. Second, the
cheaper, two-year-only program has
somewhat higher ratios of benefts to
costs, but the combined program has a
much higher level of net benefts.
In sum, an investment by the state
in either a two-year-only or a two-year
and four-year combined tuition subsidy
program will yield benefts far beyond
the costs of either program, although
not immediately. Tese benefts result
from enhanced earnings by degree
recipients and large spillover efects for
those without degrees. A sufcient share
of this increased income will be paid
to Illinois state and local governments,
and eventually annual fscal benefts will
exceed these tuition subsidy programs’
costs.
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Figure 2 Annual Costs and Fiscal Benefts of Illinois Two-Year-Only Tuition Subsidy Program
$400,000,000
$350,000,000
$300,000,000
$250,000,000
$200,000,000
$150,000,000
$100,000,000
$50,000,000

$0
$-

2020

2030

2040

2050

Total state and local revenue benefit

Tere are political challenges to
investing state resources in a program
that does not yield fscal returns until
decades later; however, the economic
benefts of free college to a state’s workers
and employers begin almost immediately.
Tis is the grounds on which many states
have—and more states should—launch
their free-college efort.
Note
1. Tis is not an ideal structure from an
equity standpoint because non-Pell-eligible
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students receive more state funding than
Pell-eligible students who may then still
struggle to cover the full cost of college
attendance; however, it is the dominant
model when it comes to statewide freecollege programs.

Timothy J. Bartik is a senior economist, Michelle
Miller-Adams is a senior researcher, Brian Pittelko
is Promise research coordinator, and Bridget
Timmeney is a senior project consultant, all at the
Upjohn Institute.
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